

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 12617

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CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, IS, US, EG, XF
SUBJECT: BRIEFING FOR SADAT ON STATUS OF MIDDLE
- EAST NEGOTIATIONS

REF: (A) STATE 117796, (B) CAIRO 10386

SUMMARY: MET WITH SADAT AND VP MUBARAK AT MIT ABUL KOM
TODAY TO CONVEY CONTENTS REFTEL A. SADAT INSTRUCTED
MUBARAK URGENTLY CONVENE MEETING OF PRIMIN AND FONMIN
AND INSTRUCT THEM STUDY QUESTIONS DAYAN HAS POSED WITH
A VIEW TO ENABLING GOE PROVIDE ANSWERS AT SUCH TIME AS
ISRAELIS RESPOND TO TWO QUESTIONS WE HAVE PUT TO THEM.
HE ENDORSED PROCEDURE SECRETARY HAD FOLLOWED. SADAT
ALSO INSTRUCTED MUBARAK TO ARRANGE CONFIDENTIAL CONSULTA-
TIONS WITH HUSSEIN AND SAUDIS RE NEGOTIATING WEST BANK/
GAZA SETTLEMENT. HE ASSUMED HUSSEIN AND SAUDIS
WILL, FOLLOWING EGYPTIAN DEMARCHE, QUERY US AND ASKED
THAT WE RESPOND ONLY GENERALLY AND PROVIDE NO DETAILS.
GOE WILL ADVISE US OF PRECISE NATURE OF ITS APPROACHES
TO HUSSEIN AND SAUDIS. SADAT ALSO AGREED THAT PRIMIN
AND FONMIN SHOULD REVIEW EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO
SEE WHAT CHANGES MIGHT BE MADE TO MAKE IT A MORE USEFUL
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NEGOTIATING DOCUMENT. HE CAUTIONED THERE IS LIMIT TO
HOW FAR GOE CAN GO WITHOUT CAUSING PROBLEMS FOR ITSELF
WITH OTHER ARABS. RE DAYAN'S INTEREST DISCUSSING SUBJECT
DIRECTLY WITH SADAT, SADAT RECALLED HE HAD TOLD CEAUSESCU,
IN RESPONSE DAYAN'S EARLIER MESSAGE ASKING FOR DIRECT
TALKS (REF B) THAT HE WAS AGREEABLE TO A MEETING BETWEEN
FONMIN KAMEL AND DAYAN AT APPROPRIATE TIME IN BUCHAREST.

SADAT INDICATED GOE NEEDS ABOUT A WEEK TO CONSULT AND FORMULATE POSITIONS AND SAID HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO SEND SOMETHING BACK WITH ME WHEN I LEAVE MAY 18 FOR CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON. END SUMMARY.

1. SINCE SADAT IS IN MIT ABUL KOM TODAY, I ARRANGED WITH VP MUBARAK TO MEET THE PRESIDENT THERE. MUBARAK WAS THE ONLY OTHER PERSON AT THE MEETING. ALLUDING TO THE EARLIER PRELIMINARY REPORT WE HAD GIVEN SADAT ON DAYAN'S VISIT TO THE U.S., I EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD HAD SOME FURTHER EXCHANGES WITH THE ISRAELI FONMIN AND WANTED TO GIVE THE PRESIDENT AN UP-TO-DATE ACCOUNT. I THEN MENTIONED THE QUESTIONS WE HAVE PUT TO DAYAN ABOUT WHAT HAPPENS AT THE END OF THE FIVE YEAR PERIOD. INDICATED DAYAN UNDERTOOK TO TRY TO GET ANSWERS, AND THAT BEGIN HAD CONFIRMED THIS, BUT THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE CABINET CONSIDERATION, WHICH COULD TAKE TWO TO THREE WEEKS BECAUSE DAYAN WILL BE OUT OF THE COUNTRY. FOLLOWING HIS RETURN TO ISRAEL AND BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR SCANDINAVIA, DAYAN HAD INDICATED TO U.S. AMBASSADOR THAT IT WOULD FACILITATE HIS EFFORT TO OBTAIN CABINET AGREEMENT TO POSITIVE RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONS CITED IF HE COULD HAVE ASSURANCES FROM SADAT ON SEVERAL QUESTIONS. I THEN LISTED THE FOUR QUESTIONS. I NOTED THAT WE HAD INFORMED DAYAN THAT IF ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO OUR QUESTIONS, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO APPROACH SADAT TO TRY TO GET ANSWERS TO
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DAYAN'S QUESTIONS. IN ABSENCE OF SOME INDICATIONS OF FURTHER ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY, WE HAD TOLD DAYAN IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN CLARIFICATIONS FROM SADAT. I STRESSED THAT DAYAN HAD INDICATED DURING WASHINGTON TALKS THAT THESE POINTS ARE HIGHLY IMPORTANT FOR ISRAEL AND HE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THEM PERSONALLY WITH SADAT.

2. I THEN REFERRED TO THE EGYPTIAN WEST BANK/GAZA COUNTER-PROPOSAL, POINTING OUT ITS FLAWS. WHAT IS NEEDED IS NOT A DOCUMENT RESTATING LEGAL PRINCIPLES, BUT A NEGOTIATING DOCUMENT. IN OUR VIEW, REVISED EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL, WHILE AN IMPROVEMENT OVER PREVIOUS DRAFT, IS STILL LESS THAN WHAT SADAT HAD SAID PUBLICLY ON SOME ISSUES. I SAID WE WOULD HOPE SADAT WOULD BE WILLING LOOK AT PAPER AGAIN WITH THESE THOUGHTS IN MIND. FINALLY, I TOLD HIM BRIEFLY ABOUT BEGIN VISIT.

3. SADAT AND MUBARAK LISTENED CAREFULLY. SADAT'S FIRST COMMENT WAS TO ASK THAT I GIVE MUBARAK A "NON-OFFICIAL" PAPER SETTING FORTH THE POINTS AND QUESTIONS I HAD MADE. (I AM DOING SO LATER THIS EVENING.) HE THEN ASKED MUBARAK

TO CONVENE AN URGENT MEETING OF THE PRIMIN AND FONMIN AND INSTRUCT THEM TO STUDY THE QUESTIONS DAYAN HAS POSED WITH A VIEW TO ENABLING GOE PROVIDE US WITH ANSWERS AT SUCH TIME AS THE ISRAELIS RESPOND TO THE TWO QUESTIONS WE HAVE PUT TO THEM. HE HEARTILY ENDORSED THE PROCEDURE THE SECRETARY HAD FOLLOWED IN THIS REGARD. SPEAKING AS MUCH TO MUBARAK AS TO ME, SADAT NOTED THAT GOE MUST BE READY WITH APPROPRIATE QUESTIONS WHEN THE ISRAELIS' QUESTIONS ARE FORMALLY PUT TO GOE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE ASKED IF THEY ARE READY TO DECLARE A WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO WITHDRAW TO THE 1967 LINES PROVIDED ALL PARTIES AGREE TO

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SIT DOWN WITH ISRAELIS TO DISCUSS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

4. SADAT NOTED THAT DAYAN, IN SOME OF HIS RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS, HAS INDICATED HIS BELIEF THAT EFFORTS TO FORMULATE A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES BE PUT ASIDE AND EGYPT BE ASKED WHETHER IT IS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WEST BANK/GAZA ARRANGEMENTS. THIS, SADAT OBSERVED, IS A TRICKY SITUATION FOR EGYPT. AS HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE SECRETARY, HE IS IN PRINCIPLE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE A WEST BANK/GAZA ARRANGEMENT IF THERE IS A SATISFACTORY DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND HUSSEIN REFUSES TO PARTICIPATE. ALTHOUGH IN TELLING HIM OF DAYAN'S QUESTIONS, WE HAD SAID NOTHING ABOUT DAYAN'S DESIRE TO PUT ASIDE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, HE ASSUMED THIS IS STILL DAYAN'S IDEA. IF THIS IS INCORRECT, HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW.

5. SADAT WENT ON TO INSTRUCT THE VP THAT ARRANGEMENTS

SHOULD BE MADE URGENTLY TO BE IN TOUCH WITH HUSSEIN AND THE SAUDIS "IN A CONFIDENTIAL WAY" TO DISCUSS THE GENERAL SUBJECT. HUSSEIN, SADAT SCOFFED, CAN NEVER KEEP A SECRET. NEVERTHELESS, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONVINCE HIM TO PARTICIPATE. THE MATTER SHOULD BE PUT TO HUSSEIN

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IN A MANNER THAT EVEN IF HE IS AFRAID OF SYRIAN REACTION AND THEREFORE BALKS AND TALKS, EGYPT WILL NOT BE EXPOSED BEFORE THE OTHER ARABS. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE HUSSEIN'S IDEAS IF EGYPT IS TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO DAYAN'S IDEA OF NEGOTIATING WEST BANK/GAZA. IT MUST BE DONE IN A MANNER THAT DOES NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT EGYPT IS "SELLING OUT" THE WEST BANK/GAZA. MATTER MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, BE PUT TO HUSSEIN IN TERMS OF EGYPT'S PREPAREDNESS TO NEGOTIATE THE GAZA PROBLEM. THE KING COULD THEN BE ASKED WHETHER HE IS ALSO READY, WHENEVER ISRAEL IS, TO NEGOTIATE WEST BANK ARRANGEMENTS. SADAT DOUBTED THAT HUSSEIN WILL BE ANY MORE WILLING, BUT THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL THAT A SECRET APPROACH BE MADE TO JORDAN ON THIS MATTER. THE SAUDIS SHOULD ALSO BE APPROACHED.

6. IN MAKING THESE APPROACHES, SADAT EMPHASIZED, HE DOES NOT PROPOSE TO PROVIDE EITHER HUSSEIN OR THE SAUDIS WITH THE DETAILS OF OUR PERTINENT DEMARCHE. HE WOULD SIMPLY PUT THE MATTER IN GENERAL TERMS. HE ASSUMED THAT BOTH HUSSEIN AND THE SAUDIS WILL THEREAFTER CONTACT US AND ASK FOR CLARIFICATION. AGAINST THIS CONTINGENCY, HE INSTRUCTED MUBARAK TO LET US KNOW THE DETAILS OF THE APPROACHES THAT GOE WILL MAKE IN NEXT FEW DAYS TO HUSSEIN AND SAUDIS. HE ASKED THAT, IF HUSSEIN AND/OR THE SAUDIS APPROACH US, WE ALSO NOT GO INTO DETAILS. SPECIFICALLY, WE SHOULD NOT MENTION THE FOUR ISRAELI QUESTIONS TO THEM. IN FACT, IN THE CASE OF THE SAUDIS, HE SUGGESTED THAT WE ONLY ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS THAT THE SAUDIS MAY ASK.

7. IN OTHER WORDS, SADAT CONCLUDED, HE IS PREPARED ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS TO TRY TO FORMULATE ANSWERS TO THE FOUR ISRAELI QUESTIONS, PROVIDED THE ISRAELI RESPONSE IS POSITIVE TO THE TWO QUESTIONS THAT WE HAVE PUT TO THEM.

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IT WILL, HOWEVER, TAKE A LITTLE TIME TO CONSULT AND PREPARE. ASKED HOW LONG HE HAD IN MIND, HE SAID ABOUT A WEEK. I NOTED THAT I WILL BE RETURNING TO THE U.S. ON CONSULTATIONS ON MAY 18 AND SUGGESTED THAT IF HE

WISHED, I WOULD BE HAPPY TO TAKE BACK ANY REPLIES. SADAT THOUGHT THIS WAS ADEQUATE TIME AND SAID HE WOULD SEND SOMETHING BACK WITH ME.

8. ON EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL, SADAT AGREED TO HAVE PRIMIN AND FONMIN TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE REVISED DOCUMENT TO SEE WHETHER IT CAN BE IMPROVED. DANGER IS, SADAT NOTED, THAT ISRAELIS ARE BOUND TO MAKE ANY DOCUMENT PUBLIC. SOME THINGS THAT HE, SADAT, HAS SAID PRIVATELY TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE SECRETARY COULD NOT AT THIS STAGE BE MADE PUBLIC WITHOUT CAUSING GOE PROBLEMS WITH OTHER ARABS. I EMPHASIZED OUR PURPOSE IS NOT TO CAUSE GOE EMBARRASSMENT, BUT THAT WE WERE SIMPLY SUGGESTING THAT GOE CONSIDER INCLUDING SOME OF THE PERTINENT POINTS THAT SADAT HAS ALREADY PUBLICLY STATED.

9. RE DAYAN INTEREST IN DISCUSSING SUBJECT PERSONALLY WITH SADAT, THE PRESIDENT RECALLED THE EARLIER DAYAN APPROACH ALONG THESE LINES (REF B). HE HAD SENT WORD BACK TO CEAUSESCU THAT, AT APPROPRIATE TIME, HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO FONMIN KAMEL MEETING WITH DAYAN IN BUCHAREST. IN THIS CONNECTION, SADAT NOTED THAT ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR HAD CALLED ON HIM FEW DAYS AGO IN ALEXANDRIA TO BRIEF HIM ON CEAUSESCU'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON. HE NOTED THAT CEAUSESCU HAD SAID NOTHING TO PRESIDENT CARTER ABOUT SADAT'S EARLIER OFFER TO ALLOW KAMEL MEET WITH DAYAN IN ROMANIA. HE WISHED US TO KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT THIS OFFER STILL STANDS.

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CHEROKEE

10. IN ORDER KEEP MY LINES CLEAR WITH FONMIN KAMEL,
I TELEPHONED HIM LATE AFTERNOON AFTER MY RETURN TO CAIRO

TO ALERT HIM TO LIKELIHOOD THAT VP MUBARAK WOULD BE
CALLING HIM. KAMEL EXPRESSED APPRECIATION.

11. SUGGEST DEPT REPEAT THIS MESSAGE TO TEL AVIV. EILTS

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